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Abstract 
The personality differentiation hypothesis holds that at higher levels of intellectual ability, personality 
structure is more differentiated. We tested differentiation at both the primary and global factor level in 
the US standardisation sample of the 16PF5 (n=10,261; 5124 male; mean age=32.69 years (SD=12.83 
years). We used a novel combined item response theory and moderated factor model approach that 
overcomes many of the limitations of previous tests. We found moderation of latent factor variances 
in five of the fifteen primary personality traits of the 16PF. At the domain level, we found no evidence 
of personality differentiation in Extraversion, Self-Control, or Independence. We found evidence of 
moderated factor loadings consistent with the personality differentiation for Anxiety, and moderated 
factor loadings consistent with anti-differentiation for Tough-Mindedness. As differentiation was 
restricted to a few personality factors with small effect sizes, we conclude that there is only very 
limited support for the personality differentiation hypothesis. 
 
Keywords: personality differentiation, personality structure, intelligence, cognitive ability 
 
Highlights:  
 First application of moderated factor models to personality differentiation. 
 No evidence of differentiation found for the global domains of Independence, Self-control or 
Extraversion. 
 Moderation of factor loadings consistent with differentiation found for Anxiety. 
 Moderation of factor loadings consistent with anti-differentiation found for Tough-
Mindedness. 
 Collectively minimal support for personality differentiation by cognitive ability 
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1.0 Introduction 1 
While very many studies have investigated the relation between intellectual ability and personality 2 
trait levels (e.g. Bartels et al., 2006; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2005; Murray et al. 2014), much less 3 
attention has been paid to the relation between intellectual ability and personality trait structure. An 4 
exception has been the work in the personality differentiation framework.  The personality 5 
differentiation hypothesis originated with Brand, Egan and Deary (1994) who proposed that at higher 6 
levels of intellectual ability, personality structure is more differentiated. The authors proposed the 7 
hypothesis by way of analogy with the ‘intelligence differentiation’ hypothesis in cognitive ability 8 
(Spearman, 1927) and was based on the idea that more intelligent individuals have more specialised 9 
skills and interests which in turn become reflected in more differentiated personality structures.   10 
  Empirical studies have largely operationalised differentiation statistically as personality 11 
constructs having smaller variances and larger inter-correlations in individuals of lower cognitive 12 
ability.  Several studies have reported a tendency for larger facet (Austin, Hofer, Deary & Eber, 2000; 13 
Harris, Vernon & Jang, 2005) or dimension variance (Austin, Deary & Gibson, 1997; De Fruyt, Aluja, 14 
García, Rolland, & Jung, 2006; Harris et al., 2005; Harris, Steinmayr, & Amelang, 2006; Myers & 15 
McCaulley, 1985; Shure & Rogers, 1963) in higher ability groups. With the exception of only a few 16 
samples (e.g. Austin et al., 1997) or traits within studies, dimension inter-correlations have indeed 17 
tended to decrease with ability level (Austin et al., 2002; De Fruyt et al., 2006; Blas & Carraro, 2011; 18 
Harris et al., 2006; Mõttus et al., 2007) though the effects are not large nor always statistically 19 
significant. This past work has led to a general perception that there is at least some support for the 20 
personality differentiation hypothesis.   21 
 In interpreting the above-mentioned evidence, it is important to consider the possibility that 22 
cognitive ability may not produce true differences in latent personality structure, but differences in the 23 
manner in which individuals interpret, understand and respond to personality items which could, in 24 
turn, impact on observed structure (Allik & McCrae, 2004;Watson, Deary & Austin, 2007). If, for 25 
example, personality items show differential reliability across the range of cognitive ability due to 26 
these or other measurement issues, then this could mask or mimic differentiation effects. That is, 27 
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observed personality differentiation could be a measurement phenomenon rather than a latent 28 
structure phenomenon (e.g. see Murray, Dixon & Johnson, 2013).  29 
The majority of previous personality studies have utilised observed scores which conflate trait 30 
and error variance making it difficult to differentiate between effects (or the absence of effects) due to 31 
differential measurement properties and differential latent structure across the range of cognitive 32 
ability. Although Brand et al., (1994) did not explicitly lay out any predictions regarding how 33 
personality differentiation should manifest in the latent variable models now commonly used to model 34 
and test hypotheses regarding personality structure, it would be reasonable to assume some parallels 35 
between personality differentiation and the intelligence differentiation hypothesis which served as its 36 
inspiration. The intelligence differentiation hypothesis proposes that g is less influential at higher 37 
levels of intellectual ability. This has been operationalized in factor models of intelligence as smaller 38 
factor loadings of specific intellectual skills (usually measured by subtest scores) for higher levels of g 39 
(Tucker-Drob, 2009; Molenaar, Dolan, & Verhelst, 2010). In personality, considering the relations 40 
between items and facets and between facets and global factors, this translates into the prediction that 41 
personality factor loadings will be reduced at higher levels of intellectual ability. That is, the 42 
personality factors interact with intellectual ability.   43 
To ensure that any differences in factor loadings to not merely reflect differential reliability, 44 
one  solution is to utilise a moderated factor model which allows moderation of item residuals to be 45 
modelled and thus explicitly models the differential reliability that might otherwise be mistaken for 46 
personality differentiation (Molenaar, Dolan, Wicherts, & van der Maas, 2010). The moderated factor 47 
model proposed by Molenaar et al. (2010) can be used to test for personality differentiation by 48 
evaluating whether the loadings in a factor model of personality are moderated by intelligence.  The 49 
approach is conceptually similar to the multi-group CFA (MG-CFA) approaches to testing personality 50 
differentiation (see DeFruyt et al. 2006; McLarnon & Carswell, 2013) but it has the advantage that it 51 
allows intellectual ability to be modelled continuously rather than across  discrete groups created 52 
using artificial dichotomisation. Further, the moderated factor model provides more easily 53 
interpretable indices of moderation because it directly estimates ‘moderation parameters’.  These 54 
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parameters represent the linear change in loadings with cognitive ability level. In spite of these 55 
advantages, the moderated factor model approach is yet to be applied to the personality 56 
differentiation. It was, therefore, the aim of the present study to apply the moderated factor model to 57 
evaluate personality differentiation in a large population representative sample  of individuals who 58 
had completed an omnibus personality inventory, the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire, 59 
Version 5 (16PF5) (Conn & Reike, 1994). 60 
2.0 Methods 61 
2.1 Sample & Measure 62 
We use the American standardisation sample of the 16PF5 (N= 10,261)
1
. The standardisation sample 63 
was reviewed in 2002 based on the US census in 2000 to ensure it remained representative of the 64 
general population of the USA with respect to a number of demographic variables including sex (5124 65 
males, 49.9%), ethnicity (77.9% white, 10.8% black, 3.6% Asian), age (mean age = 32.69 years, SD = 66 
12.83 years, range = 16 to 82) and geographic region. Conn and Rieke (1994) note that the 67 
educational level and years in education of the sample is greater than that of the US population. 68 
2.1.1 Personality measures 69 
In its current form, the 16PF5 comprises 15 personality scales, structured into five second order global 70 
factors, namely Extraversion (Self-Reliance (Q2), Warmth(A), Liveliness(F), Privateness(N), Social 71 
Boldness(H)); Anxiety (Tension(Q4), Apprehension(O), Emotional Stability(C), Vigilance(L)); 72 
Tough-Mindedness (Sensitivity(I), Openness to Change(Q1), Warmth(A), Abstractness(M)); 73 
Independence (Dominance(E), Social Boldness(H), Vigilance(L), Openness to Change(Q1)); and 74 
finally Self-Control (Abstractness(M), Rule Consciousness(G), Perfectionism(Q3), Liveliness(F)). 75 
Each of the primary personality scales consists of between 10 and 14 items with a three point response 76 
format, “No”, “?” and “Yes”, scored as 0, 1 and 2 respectively. 77 
2.1.2 Intelligence measure (moderator) 78 
In addition, the 16PF5 contains a 15 item Reasoning scale:  a short cognitive ability measure assumed 79 
to tap verbal, numerical and logical abilities. It is designed to provide a quick measure of intelligence 80 
and correlates at r=.61 the Information Inventory (Altus, 1948) and at r= .51 with the Form A, Scale 81 
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2 Culture Fair Intelligence Test (CFIT; IPAT 1973a, 1973b). The test manual reports a Cronbach’s 82 
alpha of .80 for the scale with 2 week and 2 month test-retest reliabilities of .71 and .70 respectively. 83 
Based on a sample of 2500 respondents, the Reasoning scale has been shown to have correlations with 84 
the primary factors of the 16PF ranging from r = -.27 (L: Vigilance) to r = .20 (Q1: Openness to 85 
Change) (Conn & Rieke, 1994, Appendix 5B). Investigations of differential item functioning by 86 
gender and ethnicity found no biasing by race or gender the exception of one item that functioned 87 
differently in a Hispanic sample (Conn & Rieke, 1994). 88 
2.2 Analysis Strategy 89 
2.2.1 Overview 90 
Given the 3-level hierarchical structure of the 16PF5 (items, primary factors, global factors) the 91 
statistically most sound analysis would have been to fit a second-order moderated factor model to the 92 
item level personality data (i.e., a second-order item response theory model or discrete factor model 93 
subject to moderation). However, such a model has not yet been developed. In addition, for the 94 
present undertaking fitting such a model will be numerically challenging due to the large number of 95 
items (40 to 51 across global models), the large sample size, and the high dimensionality of the 96 
16PF5. We therefore test for moderation at the primary and global factor level separately.  97 
2.2.2 Primary factor level 98 
As the primary factor level consists of item level categorical data, we adopted an item response theory 99 
approach. Our choice for a specific IRT model was guided by the recurrent finding that the middle ‘?’ 100 
option of the 16PF response scale does not consistently perform as a middle response option (Murray, 101 
Booth & Molenaar, 2015; Stark, Chernyshenko, Drasgow & Williams, 2006). As tests on interaction 102 
effects in general (Loftus, 1978) and differentiation effects in particular (Murray et al., 2013) are 103 
sensitive to scaling of the measurement, we wanted to explicitly take the ordering of the response 104 
options (including ‘?’) into account. Therefore, we adopted the Bock’s Nominal Response Model 105 
(NRM, 1972). In this model, each item category is associated with a loading parameter, unlike the 106 
discrete factor model where each item has a loading. This complicates the operationalisation of the 107 
differentiation effect in terms of moderated factor loadings. We therefore introduced the 108 
RUNNING HEAD: Personality differentiation 
 
6 
 
differentiation effect on the variance of the primary factor. That is, by making the primary factor 109 
variance an exponential function of the intelligence moderator, we could investigate whether the 110 
variance decreased for increasing levels of intelligence. Note that moderation of the factor variance 111 
has been proposed as an alternative but comparable method to test for differentiation (Molenaar et al., 112 
2010).  113 
2.2.3 Global factor level 114 
To assess differentiation at the global factor level, we used a two-step approach. First, we estimated 115 
factor scores for the primary factors using the NRM discussed above. Next, we fit a moderated first-116 
order factor model to each of the global factors. Within this model, personality differentiation was 117 
operationalised as decreasing primary factor loadings at increasing levels of intellectual ability. Note 118 
that if the primary factors are differentiated (as tested using the methods discussed above), the 119 
primary factor scores will incorporate this effect. This is desirable, as the presence of differentiation at 120 
the primary level may be the effect of differentiation at the global factor level.   121 
2.2.4 Primary Factor Moderation Analyses 122 
In order to test moderation, two models were estimated per primary factor, a baseline model and a 123 
differentiation model. In the initial baseline model we estimated all item parameters. In addition, we 124 
included a main effect of the moderator on the latent factor in order to account for the simple linear 125 
association between the moderator and the primary factor under consideration (see Purcell, 2002; 126 
Molenaar et al., 2010). Next, in the differentiation model, we included an exponential function 127 
between the latent factor variance and the moderator. Subsequently, inferences about the presence of 128 
moderation were based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC: Akaike, 1987), Bayesian 129 
Information Criterion (BIC: Raftery, 1995) and sample size adjusted BIC (saBIC: Sclove, 1987) 130 
between the baseline and the differentiation model.
2
 For all fit indices, smaller values indicate a better 131 
fitting model. We considered a difference to be practically significant if the difference in BIC between 132 
two models was > 10 (Raftery, 1995). All models were estimated in Mplus 7.4 (Muthen & Muthen) 133 
using marginal maximum likelihood estimation. Latent variable scaling and identification was 134 
achieved by fixing the first item loading to 1.   135 
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2.2.3 Global Factor Moderation Analyses  136 
For each global factor, we fit an NRM including all items proposed to measure the primary factors 137 
subsumed by that global factor. So, for example, for the global factor of Anxiety, we fit a MD-NRM 138 
with four correlated primary factors (Tension(Q4), Apprehension(O), Emotional Stability(C), 139 
Vigilance(L)), measured by 40 items.  140 
Models were estimated using marginal maximum likelihood estimation as implemented in the 141 
‘mirt’ package (Chalmers, 2012) within the R statistical software (R Core Team, 2013). The 142 
maximum a posteriori (MAP) factor scores were obtained for each primary factor. Model fit was 143 
evaluated based on root-mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 144 
and comparative fit index (CFI) using the generally recognised guidelines for fit of < 0.05, >0.90 and 145 
>0.90 respectively (Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Müller, 2003).  146 
Next, we fit a series of moderated factor models to the factor scores of the primary factors. 147 
For these first-order models, moderation of the factor loadings represents the primary test of 148 
differentiation, and provides evidence of variation in the relationship between the global factors and 149 
their indicators at different levels of cognitive ability. Linear functions were used to model the 150 
relationship between the factor loadings and the moderator. In addition to the factor loadings, we also 151 
moderated the residual variances by specifying an exponential functions between the residual 152 
variances and the moderator. Inclusion of moderated residuals in the model accounts for differential 153 
reliability that could be mis-attributed to personality differentiation if left un-modelled (Murray, 154 
Dixon & Johnson, 2013). Finally, to account for the main effect of the moderator (as discussed 155 
above), we also used a linear function between the intercepts and the moderator (See Molenaar et al., 156 
2010).  157 
Similarly as above, we first estimated a baseline model with moderation parameters on the 158 
factor loadings fixed to zero, and moderation parameters for the intercepts and residuals freely 159 
estimated (M1). We compared this model to a model (M2) in which the moderation parameters of the 160 
indicator intercepts, residuals and factor loadings were freely estimated. As above, the best fitting 161 
model was selected based a number of model fit indices: AIC, BIC, saBIC and deviance information 162 
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criterion (DIC: Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin & van der Linde, 2002). We estimated the models in Mx 163 
(Neale, Boker, Xie & Maes, 2002). Latent variable scaling and identification was achieved as follows: 164 
For each global factor, the factor loading of the first indicator was constrained to be equal to 1 for 165 
moderator values of 0. In addition, the mean of the global factors were fixed to equal 0. 166 
3.0 Results 167 
3.1 Primary Factor Moderation 168 
 Model fit indices (see Table 1) suggested moderation of factor variances was present for only 169 
five of the 15 primary scales. In the case of L, M, N, and Q1 the moderation parameter was positive, 170 
suggesting greater factor variance at higher levels of cognitive ability. In the case of Q4, the 171 
moderation parameter was negative, suggesting the opposite. The former is consistent with anti-172 
differentiation and the latter with differentiation. Apprehension (O) shows an improvement in fit, but 173 
BIC change is only 7.95, and so does not meet our threshold for practical improvement of 10. 174 
(Insert-Table-1-about-here) 175 
3.2 Primary Factor Scores 176 
Table 2 contains the model fit indices for the NRM models for each of the five global factors. All 177 
models showed good levels of model fit by all indices, with the exception of the model for Tough-178 
Mindedness that fell slightly below the desired cut-off for acceptable fit according to the CFI and TLI. 179 
Nevertheless, we conclude that the model fit is sufficient to justify the use of the primary factor scores 180 
obtained from these NRM models. 181 
(Insert-Table-2-about-here) 182 
3.3 Moderation by Reasoning Ability 183 
For Anxiety and Tough-mindedness, the model including moderation of factor loadings (M2) 184 
displayed best fit. For Independence, Self-control and Extraversion, the inclusion of moderated factor 185 
loadings did not improve model fit uniformly according to all indices, and as a result, it was 186 
concluded that the baseline model provided the most parsimonious description of the data.  187 
(Insert-Table-3-about-here) 188 
3.3.1 Anxiety 189 
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Figure 1 plots the indicator factor loadings across different levels of cognitive ability. For all 190 
indicators with positive factor loadings (Emotional Stability(C)), the moderation effect was negative, 191 
and for those indicators with negative factor loadings (Tension (Q4), Apprehension (O), Vigilance 192 
(L)), the moderation effect was positive. Thus, for all indicators, as the level of cognitive ability 193 
increases, the relation between Anxiety and its indicators becomes weaker. This finding is consistent 194 
with the personality differentiation hypothesis. However, as is clear when one considers the scales of 195 
the two panels in Figure 1, the moderation effects were generally small, and in the case of O, 196 
practically zero. 197 
(Insert-Figure-1-about-here) 198 
3.3.2 Tough-Mindedness 199 
In the case of Tough-Mindedness, one indicator (Warmth A) shows a similar pattern to the indicators 200 
of Anxiety, specifically, that the factor loading becomes weaker as ability level increases. However, 201 
the opposite effect is seen for the remaining three indicators (Sensitivity (I), Openness to Change 202 
(Q1), Abstractness (M); note lines for I and Q1 are almost entirely overlapping). Here, as ability level 203 
increases, factor loadings become stronger. This is the opposite effect to what would have been 204 
predicted by the personality differentiation hypothesis 205 
(Insert-Figure-2-about-here) 206 
4.0 Discussion 207 
We used a combined IRT and moderated factor model approach in a large standardization sample of 208 
an omnibus personality inventory, the 16PF5, in order to test the personality differentiation 209 
hypothesis. We found very limited support for the differentiation hypothesis. There was no evidence 210 
for moderation of factor loadings for the domains of Extraversion, Independence and Self-Control. 211 
Moderation of factor loadings was found for Anxiety and Tough-Mindedness, but only in the case of 212 
Anxiety was this moderation consistent with the personality differentiation hypothesis.  213 
Thus, our results do not support the personality differentiation by cognitive ability 214 
hypothesis.. Previous results, primarily framed in terms of Brand et al.’s (1994) personality 215 
differentiation hypothesis have been somewhat mixed with regards to the strength of the evidence for 216 
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the moderation of personality structure by cognitive ability, however, this may be at least partly 217 
attributable to the fact that the majority of previous studies have used observed scores which do not 218 
separate out changes in variance and inter-correlations with ability level that are due to measurement 219 
issues versus the latent constructs. Further, studies which have taken these issues into account using 220 
latent variable models have done so within the traditional multi-group CFA measurement invariance 221 
framework which has required the discretisation of the cognitive ability continuum into low and high 222 
ability groups (e.g. Mclarnon & Carswell, 2013). The current analysis is the first to utilise a method 223 
specifically tailored to testing differentiation hypotheses and which allows continuous moderation of 224 
personality structure by cognitive ability. Therefore, the models reported in the current study arguably 225 
provide the clearest tests of moderation of personality structure by cognitive ability to date.  226 
We would also question the strength of the theoretical basis for the personality differentiation 227 
hypothesis. Originally developed by analogy with the intelligence differentiation hypothesis, there has 228 
been little attempt to develop it in its own right. For example, no mechanism by which personality 229 
differentiation should occur has been articulated nor any predictions as to how to test any 230 
hypothesised mechanisms delineated. Thus, although it is now possible to conduct more sophisticated 231 
tests of the hypothesis, if the personality differentiation is to be taken seriously as a description of the 232 
interplay between cognitive ability and personality development there will be also be a need to 233 
develop a more convincing theoretical basis alongside the application of these tests.   234 
 Whilst the findings in the current study are not favourable for the personality differentiation 235 
hypothesis, three developments on the current study may prove useful contributions to work in this 236 
area. First, although the models applied here represent an advantage over previous studies, as we 237 
noted earlier, a more ideal test of differentiation would make use of the full hierarchical structure of 238 
personality inventories and fit second-order moderated models based on item level data. As this is 239 
currently not possible yet, we relied on an analysis in separate steps to test for differentiation; 240 
however, such second-order models would be welcomed to provide a more specific tests of 241 
differentiation. 242 
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 Second, a primary limitation in the current study was the use of the 16PF5 Reasoning scale as 243 
a measure of cognitive ability. Using the Reasoning scale in the current study allowed us to utilise two 244 
large standardization samples of an omnibus personality measure. However, to the extent that the 245 
Reasoning scale does not capture all aspects of cognitive ability, the results of the current study are 246 
limited. That is, if the Reasoning scale is not an adequate measure of, say, fluid ability, then it is 247 
possible stronger moderation of fluid ability may be observed with a different estimate of the 248 
cognitive ability of participants. However, whilst we acknowledge that the Reasoning scale is not an 249 
optimal measure, we suggest the most likely consequence of this is a reduction in power to detect 250 
differentiation, rather than any systematic bias producing spurious moderation. Given the generally 251 
small moderation effects found in the current analysis, replication of these results with a more 252 
comprehensive measure of cognitive ability would be beneficial. 253 
 Lastly, we had only self- and not informant reports of personality. Combining self- and other- 254 
reports to assess differentiation would provide a more robust test of the hypothesis.  Finally, given 255 
that our sample was all drawn from the same Western educated society, it is possible that it was too 256 
homogeneous to detect differentiation effects or that differentiation is more related to education or 257 
other cultural variables than cognitive ability. Previous studies have suggested that differentiation may 258 
be detectable when considering societies that differ dramatically in cultural set-up e.g. when 259 
comparing urbanised with forager-horticulturist societies (Gurven et al., 2013).  260 
5.0 Conclusion 261 
 In the current study, we found little evidence for the moderation of personality trait variance 262 
using moderated factor models. Only the global domain on Anxiety showed evidence of factor 263 
loading moderation consistent with the differentiation hypothesis. Moderated factor models overcome 264 
the key limitations of previous studies of personality variance moderation, thus arguably providing a 265 
more valid test of hypotheses predicting personality variance moderation than has been possible to 266 
date. 267 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1: Estimated factor loadings for Anxiety indicators as a function of Reasoning ability. C= 
Emotional Stability; L = Vigilance; O = Apprehension; Q4 = Tension. Moderation parameters for 
factor loadings were: C= -0.0082, L= 0.0030, O= 0.0009, Q4= 0.0164.  
 
Figure 2: Estimated factor loadings for Tough-mindeness indicators as a function of Reasoning 
Ability. A= Warmth; I=Sensitivity; M=Abstractness ;Q1= Openness to Change. Moderation 
parameters for factor loadings are: A= -0.0119, I= 0.0242, M= 0.0538, Q1= 0.0277. Lines 
representing Q1 and I are overlapping. 
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Table 1:  
Model fit statistics and parameter estimates for the first order NRM models assessing moderated latent factor variances 
    Parameter Estimates from moderation models 
 AIC BIC saBIC Main 
Effect 
p-value Intercept 
Variance 
p-value Moderation 
Variance 
p-value 
A baseline 167663.23 167988.85 167845.85       
A moderation 167660.85 167993.71 167847.53 0.029 <.001 0.771 <.001 0.016 .107 
          
C baseline 140969.76 141266.44 141136.15       
C moderation 140971.30 141275.22 141141.75 -0.019 .001 0.687 <.001 0.005 .513 
          
E baseline 153436.92 153733.60 153603.30       
E moderation 153438.96 153742.88 153609.41 -0.004 .476 0.475 <.001 0.001 .917 
          
F baseline 165475.71 165772.39 165642.09       
F moderation 165473.82 165777.74 165644.27 0.017 <.001 -0.339 .003 0.014 .074 
          
G baseline 170039.14 170364.76 170221.76       
G moderation 170038.30 170371.16 170224.98 0.053 <.001 0.342 <.001 0.012 .110 
          
H baseline 150075.98 150372.66 150242.37       
H moderation 150074.50 150378.41 150244.94 0.028 <.001 1.379 <.001 0.013 .105 
          
I baseline 186189.90 186515.53 186372.52       
I moderation 186184.85 186517.71 186371.53 -0.021 <.001 0.346 <.001 0.018 .017 
          
L baseline 161133.51 161430.19 161299.90       
L moderation 161115.88 161419.80 161286.33 0.172 <.001 0.850 <.001 0.031 <.001 
          
M baseline 170741.06 171066.69 170923.68       
M moderation 170715.52 171048.38 170902.20 -0.045 <.001 0.689 <.001 0.037 <.001 
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N baseline 158223.58 158520.26 158389.97       
N moderation 158162.44 158466.36 158332.89 0.045 <.001 0.784 <.001 0.055 <.001 
          
O baseline 163933.76 164230.44 164100.14       
O moderation 163918.58 164222.49 164089.02 -0.071 <.001 1.683 <.001 0.029 <.001 
          
Q1 baseline 236207.04 236619.50 236438.36       
Q1 moderation 236133.51 236553.20 236368.89 -0.045 <.001 -1.786 <.001 0.063 <.001 
          
Q2 baseline 155771.68 156068.36 155938.07       
Q2 moderation 155767.61 156071.52 155938.05 -0.066 <.001 1.329 <.001 0.017 0.022 
          
Q3 baseline 155469.66 155766.34 155636.05       
Q3 moderation 155471.55 155775.47 155642.00 0.064 <.001 0.158 .145 0.002 .774 
          
Q4 baseline 157838.30 158134.98 158004.69       
Q4 moderation 157817.79 158121.71 157988.24 -0.053 <.001 0.828 <.001 -0.031 <.001 
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Table 2: 
Model fit for the multi-dimensional NRM models 
 
 RMSEA 
(95% CI) 
CFI TLI 
Anxiety .045 
(.044 to .045) 
.95 .95 
Tough-Minded .046 
(.046 to .047) 
.87 .86 
Independence .035 
(.035 to .036) 
.94 .93 
Self-Control .043 
(.042 to .043) 
.93 .92 
Extraversion .045 
(.044 to .045) 
.94 .93 
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Table 3:  
Model fit indices for the moderated factor models for the global scales of the 16PF5 
 AIC DIC BIC saBIC 
Anxiety     
M1: Baseline Model -22893.85 -122175.39 -159873.92 -94689.68 
M2: Free Loadings -22997.45 -122216.39 -159911.25 -94733.36 
     
Tough-Mindedness     
M1: Baseline Model 4648.90 -108404.02 -146102.55 -80918.31 
M2: Free Loadings 2443.54 -109495.90 -147190.76 -82012.87 
     
Independence     
M1: Baseline Model 1422.62 -110017.15 -147715.69 -82531.44 
M2: Free Loadings 1428.79 -110003.27 -147698.13 -82520.25 
     
Self-Control     
M1: Baseline Model -6010.64 -113733.78 -151432.32 -86248.07 
M2: Free Loadings -6009.30 -113722.32 -151417.17 -86239.29 
     
Extraversion     
M1: Baseline Model -16777.74 -146799.45 -193922.62 -112442.31 
M2: Free Loadings -16793.89 -146794.03 -193912.60 -112440.24 
 
Note: Values in bold font represent the best fitting models. 
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Figure 1: 
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Figure 2: 
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Footnote 
1
Copyright (c) 1993 by the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, Inc.. Champaign, Illinois, 
USA. All rights reserved. Reproduced by special permission of the publisher. Further reproduction is 
prohibited without permission of IPAT Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of OPP Ltd., Oxford, 
England. 
 
2
The standard errors of the moderation parameters are likely wrong as they are based on the 
assumption of a symmetrical sampling distribution of the parameters, which is unlikely for interaction 
effects. 
 
